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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
by
John L. FitzGerald*

T

HE PAST year witnessed few cases of major importance in the development of administrative law. A greater number of cases of some
interest were decided, of course, the more significant of which are included
in this Survey.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO NOTICE AND HEARING

Notice. City of Houston v. Fore,' referred to in last year's Survey,' was
affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court. The supreme court agreed with the
court of civil appeals' that a hearing to determine a special property assessment could not be administratively determined with only constructive
notice to the land owners, when their names and addresses were known
to the city.' This decision, predicated upon the procedural due process
requirement of the fourteenth amendment, is parallel to the position recently assumed by the United States Supreme Court.' The state court
noted that a distinction should be drawn between statutory assessment
formulas and administratively determined special assessments, the former
requiring no notice or hearing.
Hearing. In City of Houston v. Fore' the supreme court held that under
certain conditions constructive notice is insufficient where a municipality
levies assessments against property. The court also held that there is no
constitutional right to a hearing prior to special assessment for a paving
improvement if the state legislature fixed the assessment. But, if it delegates the establishment of the assessment to a municipality, a hearing is
necessary. This follows generally accepted constitutional principles and
restates the law as established in the early Texas case of Hutcheson v.
Storrie.!
IL. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION ON STATUTORY AUTHORITY

An applicant who failed to pass an examination required of polygraph
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University of Washington;
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1412 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1967). For further discussion, see Wingo, Municipal Corporations, this
Survey, at footnote 36.
' FitzGerald, Administrative Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 199, 205 (1967).
3401
S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
"The defendant-owner of the land had resided at the address for twenty-seven years, his
name and address were on the city tax rolls, and the city had written him at that address in prior

years.
a Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962). See also three United States Supreme
Court cases which the court cited in Fore: Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 352
U.S. 948 (1956); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
8412 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1967); see text accompanying note 2 supra.
792 Tex. 685, 51 S.W. 848 (1899).
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operators under the new Texas Polygraph Examiners Act8 contended the
statute was in violation of article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution
since it impaired the obligations of valid and subsisting contracts which
the applicant held on the date of the statute's enactment. In Dovalina v.
Albert' the court of civil appeals held that the statute's effect on the applicant's existing contracts was only incidental. The court reasoned that the
statute was valid because it only required polygraph operators to possess
minimum skills so that deception and distortion could be detected. Thus
the statute was a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
III.

ADJUDICATION

Right To Be Advised of Nature of Claim. Before they may impose administrative sanctions, administrative tribunals whose statutes require notice and hearing must be precise in the notice given of the charges preferred. In City of San Antonio v. Poulos" this problem was presented when
a city detective was discharged for failure to report information concerning a gun allegedly stolen by a third party. The city charged that the
detective violated city personnel rules" by failing to report the information. In a five-to-four decision the Texas Supreme Court refused to uphold the city's action. The court held that the detective had been given
inadequate notice and that the facts charged should have specifically referred to the rule claimed to have been violated. The dissenting justices
protested that the majority demanded from the administrative agency all
of the technicalities of an indictment.
Compelling Testimony-Subpoena Power. On a motion for rehearing in
Gerst v. Nixon" the contention was made that the appellant was denied
due process of law because the Savings and Loan Act" failed to confer
authority upon the Savings and Loan Commissioner to issue subpoenas
or to compel testimony. The supreme court declined to pass upon the
question directly, denying the motion for lack of a showing of prejudice.
Authority exists on both sides of the question but the majority of jurisdictions find no denial of due process merely because of the absence of
subpoena power. This may be attributable in part to the absence of a
showing of prejudice in particular cases. 4
Right to a Hearing. The Supreme Court of Texas in a five-to-four de'TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2615f-2 (1965).
'409 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
"o11 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 83 (1967).
"The rules allegedly violated provided that (1) an officer must report all information he may
receive about any violation or suspected violation; (2) the officer must give information regarding
any filing; and (3) an officer shall not wilfully misrepresent any matter, or sign any false statement or report. Because of the alleged violations the detective was discharged under a rule which
provided for discharge for violation of the rules and regulations of the department.
"2411 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1966).
asTEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 852(a) (1964).
"'Brinkley v. Hassig, 130 Kan. 874, 289 P. 64 (1930); see I F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 313-16 (1965).
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cision held that competing carriers are entitled to be heard by the Railroad Commission on the issue of whether a certified carrier applying to
sell its certificate has permitted its regulated business to become dormant."
The court based its decision upon a reconciliation of the transfer provisions" of the motor carrier law with the revocation and complaint provisions.17 The court rejected the Commission's contention that its longstanding practice was to handle dormancy (revocation) matters separately
and that it had the discretion to do so. It left undisturbed the rule of
previous decisions that the question of "public convenience and necessity"
was not an appropriate consideration in a transfer hearing. The dissenting
members of the court agreed with the Commission's contentions and said
that (1) to add a dormancy issue in a transfer proceeding would, in effect,
introduce the question of public convenience and necessity, (2) the majority were intruding upon the Commission's discretion to weigh complaints and determine when to institute revocation proceedings, and (3)
the obvious result will be to permit competitors to delay indefinitely the
processing of transfer applications. The last point seems to be the real
issue between the majority and minority views, and is not a judicial question in the absolute sense: it is a legislative question. The majority view
seems correct. Questions of public interest are clearly contemplated for
Commission consideration under the transfer section of the law. If protestants raise substantial public interest questions with adequate specificity
and verification the Act also contemplates that something should be done.
It would seem that the Commission can prevent undue prolongation of
transfer proceedings by requiring specificity and substance in the presentation of complaints. This requirement would help preserve the Commission's administrative discretion in ordering its business and otherwise
carrying out its functions, while respecting the court's insistence on preventing possible arbitrary administrative action.
The decision, however, contains elements of judicial superintendence.
The court pointed out that, by custom, transfer approvals were conditioned upon the certificate transferred being in "good standing" and not
subject to cancellation, thus in a sense hoisting the Commission by its own
procedures. The court went further, however, and called it "unconscionable" for the Commission to collect ten per cent of the transfer price, as
that the transfer which it
the law provides it shall, "and later determine
1'
had approved was of invalid certificates. 8
Judicial Hearing. A transportation company's self-insurance certificate
was cancelled by the Texas Department of Public Safety under the Texas
Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act.'" Though the statutes provided
for a notice and hearing, none was given. The trial court tried the case
"Brown
1

Express, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 415 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. 1967).

TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 911 (b),

§

5 (1964).

§ 12(4).
1415 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Tex. 1967).
17Id.

" Tx. REv. Civ.

STAT. ANN. art. 6701h

(1967).
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de novo on appeal and concluded that the Department action was invalid
for failure to comply with the statute as well as failure to obtain evidence
constituting reasonable grounds for the cancellation as required by statute.
A court of civil appeals in Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Banks Transp.
Co. affirmed. It said, however, that the facts before the Department were
immaterial, the appeal being de novo. The court could take evidence and
determine what constituted reasonable grounds for cancellation. A judicial
hearing was thus substituted for the administrative hearing provided by
statute. The case finds precedent in such cases as Jordan v. American
Eagle Fire Insurance Co."
Evidence. The Savings and Loan Commissioner, after hearing, denied
Gibraltar's application to open a branch office in Houston on the basis
of three unfavorable findings: (a) inadequate showing of public need,
(b) inadequate showing of prospective profitable operation, and, (c)
potentiality of undue harm to competitors. The Commissioner did not
consider an affidavit attesting to the public need for the branch office,
though the affidavit was a part of the administrative record. The district
court reversed and remanded, holding that there was no substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner's action. The court of civil appeals"2
held that (1) the Commissioner acted correctly in not taking the ex parte
affidavit into consideration, and (2) the court on appeal could not consider the testimony given in the trial court by the affiant since, under
the recent decision in Gerst v. Nixon," judicial review is limited under
the Savings and Loan Act to the administrative record."m The court of civil
appeals remanded to the Commissioner. It concluded a remand would
serve the cause of justice, since the Savings and Loan Act 2 had been substantially revised after the start of the proceeding and uncertainties in
the law had been settled by the supreme court in Nixon.
The Texas Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion,6 refused, n.r.e.,
an application for writ of error. The supreme court approved the court
of civil appeals' determination that there was substantial evidence reasonably to support the Commissioner's finding of no public need for the
branch office applied for by the Association. The court expressed agreement with conclusions (1) and (2) of the court of appeals, but, on
20417 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
21 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948).

error granted.

' Gerst v. Gibraltar Say. Ass'n, 413 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd per curiam, 417
S.W.2d 584 (1967).
234 1 1 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1966).
'TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 852(a), § 11.12(5)(b) (1964) provides in part: "[N]o
evidence shall be admissible which was not adduced at the hearing on the matter before the Commission or officially noticed in the record of such hearing."
" Under the prior law, former TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 881a-2 (1951), the Commissioner was to determine if "public convenience and advantage" would be served by a new institution and if "the population in the neighborhood . . . affords a reasonable promise of adequate
support.
... The present law, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, S 2.08 (1964), provides in
part that the Commissioner must find "there is a public need for the proposed association and the
volume of business in the community in which the proposed association will conduct its business
is such as to indicate profitable operation ..
"
2"Gibraltar Say. Ass'n v. Gerst, 417 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1967).
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technical grounds,"7 expressly refrained from discussing whether the court
below should have rendered judgment affirming the Commissioner rather
than remanding the cause to that official in the interest of justice.
The Gibraltar case illustrates that growing pains are ahead before adjustment can be made to all of the inroads upon judicial review under the
"Texas Substantial Evidence Rule" occasioned by the appeal provisions
of the revised Savings and Loan Act, as interpreted in Nixon. 8 In the
present case the court of civil appeals notably gave effect to language in
Nixon by pointing out that all " 'hearsay' evidence, not subject to some
exception, has no probative force even though admitted without exception." The supreme court did not generalize to the same extent. It confined its per curiam opinion to an approval of the holdings that substantial evidence supported the administrative findings of lack of public
need for the proposed branch office; and that an ex parte affidavit contained in the administrative record may not be considered by the court in
determining whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner's order, even though the affiant testified at the trial in the district court.
The federal courts," and probably the majority of the state courts" generally would not require that evidence inadmissible in a judicial trial be
for all practical purposes excised from an administrative record. 2 If the
evidence was admitted by an agency of the executive branch of the federal
government, which is not bound by rules of evidence (and what ones
are?), and if it appears to be sufficiently trustworthy to be relied on in
the ordinary conduct of serious business affairs, it can be considered by
the reviewing court in determining the existence of substantial evidence,
provided there is other competent evidence looking in the same direction.
The trend in the federal courts 3 is not to impose the caveat of the proviso.
Some state courts,' seemingly a small minority, require that the evidence
constituting substantial evidence must be competent. It is far from clear
that the Texas Supreme Court intends to go this far, but it came close
in Gerst v. Nixon, in language which the court of civil appeals quoted in
the case under discussion." This language may have been occasioned by the
fact that the supreme court in Nixon was compelled to determine the
27 The court stated that the rules and decisions cited by the court of civil appeals in support
of its remand to the Commissioner did not support its action. The court refrained from resolving
the issue on the ground that it was properly before the court.
28411 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1966).
29413 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
'OK. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 14.11 (1959).
3'2 AM. JUR. Administrative Law §§ 376-82 (1962); E. STASON & F. COOPER, THE LAW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS 402-405

(3d ed. 1957).
" Contra, Southern Stevedoring Co. v. Voris, 190 F.2d 275 (5th Cit. 1951) (ex parte letter
reports, not under oath, excluded; due process requires right of cross examination).
'SW. McGrath Corp. v. Hughes, 264 F.2d 314 (5th Cit. 1959); NLRB v. Remington Rand,
Inc., 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938). But see NLRB v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen 4 of N. America, 202 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1953).
1

K. DAVIS,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 14.12

(1959).

S In Nixon the supreme court stated, "The circumstance that the record of the Commissioner's
hearing contains hearsay or other species of evidence deemed unreliable is a matter for the consideration of the trial judge in determining the issue of 'substantial evidence'." 411 S.W.2d 350,
357 (Tex. 1966).
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constitutionality of a statute which it construed as precluding the courts
from taking any evidence in reviewing the Savings and Loan Commissioner's orders. The supreme court partially bridged the gap between customary judicial review and this iconoclastic legislative approach by emphasizing the formal hearing procedures the statute enjoined upon the
administration. But it also found that the legislature has authority to restrict judicial examination into administrative arbitrariness to the record
made before the administrative tribunal. The reviewing court may, however, consider the reliability of the evidence taken at the administrative
hearing in determining the issue of "substantial evidence."
Having hurdled the major question in Nixon, and having properly
found no constitutional infringment of the court's power in the area of
regulation under consideration, it would be a mistake by over-superintendence of the administrative tribunal to hold it to hearing rules often
not followed by the courts themselves in non-jury trials. This mistake
was avoided by the supreme court in its per curiam opinion.
In Gibraltarthe court of civil appeals might on first reading appear to
be clearly over-superintending by its remand to the Commissioner for
further administrative development of the public need issue through testimony by a witness such as the affiant, and the court could have obtained
the same result by reversing the trial court with directions. In either case,
however, the court of civil appeals seems to be asking for no more than
an adequate administrative pursuit of the public need issue by requiring
the obtaining of evidence which both the administrative tribunal and the
reviewing court can duly consider, each acting in its proper sphere.
IV.

RULE MAKING

Statutory Authority. The court of civil appeals decision in State Board
of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp 6 was discussed in last year's Survey 7
while appeal was pending to the supreme court. The plaintiffs, owners of
a chain of optical clinics, challenged the power of the Board of Examiners
in Optometry to adopt a rule prohibiting the use of an assumed name in
the practice of optometry. The trial court upheld the Board's authority
to make the rule, a decision which was reversed by the court of civil
appeals. The supreme court agreed with the trial court and in reversing
the court of civil appeals stated that "The practice of a profession under
a trade name has often been regulated and prohibited by rules."3 s However, it would appear that none of the cass" cited by the court offers a
a6412 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1967).
a FitzGerald, Administrative Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 199, 216-19
(1967).
38412

S.W.2d 307, 312

(Tex.),

cert. denied,

88 S. Ct. 241

(1967).

"' Five of the nine cases cited from other jurisdictions involve rules regulating advertising, not
use of trade names: Fisher v. Schumacher, 72 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1954); State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Bohl, 162 Kan. 156, 174 P.2d 998 (1946); Strauss v. University of New York, 161
N.Y.S.2d 97, 141 N.E.2d 595 (Ct. App. 1957); Strauss v. University of New York, 282 App.
Div. 593, 125 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Strauss v. University of New York, 186 Misc. 242,
59 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Sup. Ct. 1945). The sixth upheld a very general statute prohibiting a corporation from employing a licensed optometrist and obtaining fees for his services, Pearle Optical v.
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precise analogy to the present case; indeed the Supreme Court of Texas
did not cite the cases as such. The court's reference to extra-state regulation of optometry by administrative rule, however, tends to impart a

tone of uniformity of regulation. Moreover, as Justice Smith's dissenting
opinion' emphasizes, the majority opinion responds somewhat more summarily than analytically to the serious contention that a broad delegation

of power was not given by the legislature to the state Board. "1 In other
respects the majority opinion gives painstaking analysis to the issues before
it. The result here might have been forecast by the decision in Kee v.

Baber," ten years before, which upheld rules adopted by the Board of

Examiners in Optometry regulating "bait advertising," the examination
of patients and the practice of optometry on the premises of mercantile

establishments.
V.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Method of Review: Statutory Appeals. The rule is well settled in Texas
that appeal does not lie from an order of an administrative tribunal unless a statute provides for appeal, or unless the order violates a constitutional right or adversely affects a vested property right. However, as the
Texas Supreme Court said in Stone v. Texas Liquor Control Board,"3
affirming a court of civil appeals judgment," this rule when coupled with
an unusual statutory review provision' can lead to "anomalous" results.
A citizen who unavailingly protested the grant of a beer license to one
Bozarth before the county judge and the Texas Liquor Control Board
was held to have no right to appeal to the district court. The only right
of appeal from the decision of the Board is given by statute to the applicant who is denied a license. The same statute by implication allows an
State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 219 Ga. 364, 133 S.E.2d 374 (1963); another case involved
a statute conferring express authority upon a state board to prohibit advertising or the attempt
to practice under an assumed name, Silverman v. Board of Registration in Optometry, 344 Mass.
129, 181 N.E.2d 540 (1962); another involved a general statute under which a rule was adopted
forbidding the splitting of fees and misleading signs, Toole v. State Bd. of Dentistry, 306 Mich.
527, 11 N.W.2d 229 (1943). The ninth case, which concerned a Mississippi statute delegating
authority to a state board of optometry to revoke optometric certificates for unprofessional and
unethical conduct and to adopt necessary regulations to carry out the provisions of the statute,
held that the Board could prohibit by rule window displays and use of lay persons for professional
services, but could not prohibit by rule the fitting of hearing aids since this would be in excess of
the granted power, State Bd. of Optometry v. Orkin, 249 Miss. 430, 162 So. 2d 883 (1964).
" State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 412 S.W.2d 307, 314 (Tex.), cert. denied,
88 S. Ct. 241 (1967).
4i Ten statutory grounds are provided for revocation of licenses by the Board. TEX. REv. CiV.
STAT. ANN. art. 4563 (1960). A license may be revoked when the licensee (1) is guilty of gross
immorality; (2) is guilty of any fraud in the practice of optometry; (3) is unfit or incompetent
by reason of negligence; (4) has been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor which involves
moral turpitude; (5) is an habitual drunkard or addicted to drugs or is insane; (6) has employed, hired, or induced another not licensed to practice in Texas, to so practice; (7) aids or
abets in the practice of optometry any person not licensed to practice; (8) employs solicitors for
the purpose of obtaining patronage; (9) lends, leases or otherwise places his license at the disposal
of any person not licensed to practice; or (10) has wilfully or repeatedly violated any of the first
nine provisions.
42157 Tex. 387, 303 S.W.2d 376 (1957).
4'417 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1967).
"Stone v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 407 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
'TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 667-6 (1952).
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appeal to the court of civil appeals by a citizen who protests a judgment

of the district court reversing a denial of a license by the Board. Otherwise, the protesting citizen has no appeal since he lacks a constitutional
right, a vested right, or a statutory right.' No one may appeal the granting of the license.
Article 6701h, section 2 (b) "7 in broad outline provides that appeal from
drivers' license suspension orders of the Department of Public Safety may
be filed in the county where the aggrieved party resides. In Scbwantz v.
Department of Public Safety "8 the court of civil appeals held that such
appeals may not be prosecuted in a county other than that provided by
statute. The statute was not only a venue statute but also provided for the
exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from such license suspension orders. Since
the license was only a statutory privilege and not a vested property right,
no appeal constitutionally was required to review the suspension. The
opinion in Scbwantz" contains helpful references to a number of differing
statutory provisions for review of administrative decisions with specific
reference to the county in which the appeal shall be instituted.
De Novo Review: Effect of Appeal. In State Board of Medical Examiners
v. Manns0 the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of civil appeals
and relied upon its reasoning: If a cross-action is filed by an administrative
tribunal in a proceeding reviewing de novo a licensing revocation, its dismissal for want of prosecution renders the revocation invalid."
Article 4506,2 providing for appeal from administrative orders of the
Medical Examiners, declares that the appeal should be "by trial de novo
as it exists between justice and county courts."'" However, the statute
also expressly provides that the Board's order shall not be suspended during appeal except by stay or injunction upon application to the district
court. If de novo review in this instance is given the same effect as review
in civil actions between justice and county courts, the result is an automatic cancellation of the Board's order when appeal is filed." But, the
statute expressly forbids such a result. In Mann the problem was further
complicated by the cross-action filed by the Board in the review proceeding. If the rules applicable to appeals between the justice and county courts
are applied, the order loses its validity; if the statutory proviso against sus"The result reached by the court of civil appeals and supreme court in this case had previously been reached in State v. Lemaster, 275 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) and Texas Liquor
Control
Bd. v. Abogado, 172 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
47
TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h, § 2(b) (1967).
48415 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref.
48
'd. at 14-15.
58413 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1967) (Mann, the aggrieved doctor, was seeking to compel the Board
by mandamus to issue him a license).
" In the court of civil appeals opinion it was emphasized that if the dismissal did not annul
the Board's order, the doctor would be placed in the position of having to prosecute himself. Mann
v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 403 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), discussed in FitzGerald, Administrative Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 199, 200 (1967).
saTEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4506 (1966).
53 Id.

54Harter v. Curry, 101 Tex. 187, 105 S.W. 988 (1907); Woldert Grocery Co. v. Booneville
Elevator Co., 99 Tex. 581, 91 S.W. 1082 (1906).
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pension is applied, the order remains in effect. The supreme court stated
"[A]s the Court of Civil Appeals put it, a contrary holding would permit the Board to 'win its case by failing to prosecute in the same manner
and to the same extent as it could win it by a successful prosecution before
s In support of its decision the court cited Bender Bros.
Court and Jury.' ..
6 involving an appeal from a justice court to a county court.
v. Lockett,"
In this cited case the court stated that the appeal has the effect ab initio
of cancelling the judgment, and that the successful plaintiff in the justice
court bears the burden of prosecuting the case after appeal.
Mann is distinguishable from Bender Bros., for not only did the former
involve an administrative agency, but the statute under construction, while
providing for de novo review, also provided that the administrative order
would not be suspended during pendency of the appeal except as the court
should exercise its equitable powers to stay the effectiveness of the order.'
The provision "trial de novo, as such term is commonly used and intended
in an appeal from the justice court to the county court,"'8 if strictly construed, would necessitate the result of Bender Bros.; but this would give
no effect to the proviso, the apparent intent of which was to continue the
administrative order in effect except as the court might enjoin its enforcement during court review. The court reconciled the two conflicting provisions of the statute by somewhat strained reasoning." Such strict decisions often result in the hamstringing of administrative process.
As was said in last year's Survey Article, the decision reached by both
the court of civil appeals and the Texas Supreme Court in this case exalts
a niche-like application of de novo concepts over analysis of legislative
intent. It would seem to follow that the aggrieved party who voluntarily
dismisses his de novo appeal puts the immediate burden on the administrative tribunal of proceeding to prove its case and to obtain at least a
"default" judgment.

"State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Mann, 413 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tex. 1967).
'" 64 Tex. 556 (1885). The supreme court in Bender Bros. stated: "The judgment below being
vacated, it isthe duty of plaintiff to prosecute his suit to obtain a new judgment, and, if dismissed, he is out of court as effectually as if his suit had never been commenced in the court
below."
"7TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4506 (1966). "Any person whose license to practice medicine has been cancelled, revoked or suspended by the Board may . . . take an appeal . . . but the
decision of the Board shall not be enjoined or stayed except on application to such district court
after notice to the Board."
s TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4506 (1966).
s"The cross-action loses its significance because the court stresses that the Board must prosecute
the action in the district court as plaintiff. This is only an extension of the rule announced in
Scott v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1964) where the court held that
when the doctor appeals from an order of the Board, the burden of proof is on the Board.
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